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NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
EMINENT DOMAIN-CONSERVATION-EVIDENCE NECESSARY To
DETERMINE IF A REGULATION RESTRICTING THE USE OF PROPERTY
IS INVALID AS A TAKING WITHOUT COMPENSATION*-The defend-
ant, owner of 49.4 acres of marsh land adjacent to the coastal waters
of Wareham, Massachusetts, had, pursuant to a recently enacted
Massachusetts statute,' notified the appropriate authorities of his
intention to dredge a channel through the marsh as part of a project
to fill the marsh for the construction of houses with water rights for
boating. After a hearing, the Director of Marine Fisheries notified
the defendant "that in the interest of protecting marine fisheries
and maintaining the ecological components of this estuarine com-
plex . . . no fill of any type be placed on the area known as Broad
Marsh." When the defendant ignored the director's order, the
Commissioner of Natural Resources and the Director of Marine
Fisheries successfully brought a bill in equity to enjoin violation of
the commissioner's order and to require the removal of all fill placed
on the marsh in violation of the order.
On appeal,2 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ac-
knowledged that the restrictions placed on the defendant served the
valid public purpose of protecting marine fisheries, but, according
to the court, this was not the "whole matter." "A crucial issue is
whether, notwithstanding the meritorious character of the regula-
tion, there has been such a deprivation of the practical uses of a land-
owner's property as to be the equivalent of a taking without com-
pensation. ' 3 The court cites two recent zoning cases from New
Jersey and Connecticut as having pertinency. In Morris County
Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills,4
the court struck down an ordinance which proscribed, among other
things, the filling of swamp land in a so-called "Meadows Develop-
ment Zone." Conceding that the ordinance served a commendable
public purpose, the court points out that such objectives can be ac-
complished by statutes which empower the state and its subdivisions
to purchase or condemn property needed for flood control, parks,
playgrounds, conservation, recreation and even open space. When an
ordinance so restricts the use of land that it "cannot practically be
utilized for any reasonable purpose or when the only permitted uses
* Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 206 N.E.2d 666 (Mass.
1965).
1. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 130, § 27A (1965).
2. Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 206 N.E.2d 666 (Mass.
1965).
3. 206 N.E.2d at 669.
4. 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
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are those to which the property is not adapted or which are econom-
ically infeasible," it is "constitutionally unreasonable and confisca-
tory."' In Dooley v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n,8 in which a
similar ordinance was struck down as being "confiscatory," the court
proposed the following test: "Where most of the value of a per-
son's property has to be sacrificed so that community welfare may
be served, and where the owner does not directly benefit from the
evil avoided . . . the occasion is appropriate for the exercise of
eminent domain."7
What makes the Volpe case interesting is not the reiteration of
the principle, expressed in so many cases, that regulations for a
valid public purpose may be so restrictive as to constitute a taking,
but rather its statement of the information which it deems necessary
for the court to have to decide the issue. As Mr. Justice Harlan ar-
ticulated the "taking" theory in a line of cases beginning with Mug-
ler v. Kansas,8 the constitutional issue depends on whether or not
the government has asserted a proprietary interest in the regulated
property, and whether the private use is of the "nuisance type"
that can be abated without payment of compensation. With the in-
creased government activity of the twentieth century, the sharp
distinctions suggested by Justice Harlan were blurred, and a more
sophisticated approach was formulated by Mr. Justice Holmes
which attempted to reconcile the needs of the community to regu-
late under the police power with the constitutional protection af-
forded private property under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
Thus, he proposed to weigh the disadvantages imposed on the
owner of regulated land against the advantages accruing to the com-
munity from regulation, with particular emphasis on the economic
harm to the property owner.9 Although today no opinion involving
a taking problem is deemed complete without a direct quote from
Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,10 it is fair to say
that the test is easier to state than apply. Not only it is difficult to
meaningfully compare public benefit and private harm,'1 but the
definition of economic interest in this context is a much-disputed
problem.1" Often, as in the cases cited by the court in Volpe, the
5. Id. at 557, 193 A.2d at 242.
6. 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964).
7. Id. at 312, 197 A.2d 774.
8. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
9. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
10. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See, e.g., Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe
& Co., 206 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Mass. 1965), and cases cited therein.
11. See Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733, 769 (1964).
12. See, e.g., Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36, 50 (1964).
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test of "taking" is stated in terms of "confiscation"; that is, whether
the regulation deprives the regulated land of all reasonable value.
In some of the older cases the United States Supreme Court has
looked beyond the negative aspects of the regulation, seeking to
ascertain whether there is conferred on the regulated owner a cor-
relative benefit not enjoyed by the community at large. If so, such
''average reciprocity of advantage" is apparently treated as being
equivalent to "just compensation."' 3 Not alone have the courts
struggled rather unsuccessfully to develop a workable "taking" test;
the academicians have also toiled in the vineyard. Professor Alli-
son Dunham has argued that no compensation is required when
the regulation only forces the owner to bear the external cost of
his own activity, but that there is a "taking" when the regulation
is designed only to produce community benefits. 4 Still another re-
cently suggested approach is predicated on a proposed distinction
"between the role of government as participant and the government
as mediator in the process of competing economic claims."' 5 Thus,
when "economic loss is incurred as a result of government enhance-
ment of its own resource position" there is a taking, but "losses,
however severe, incurred as a consequence of government acting
merely in its arbitral capacity are to be viewed as a non-compensable
exercise of a police power."16
Thus the Massachusetts court in Jolpe had available to it a
variety of approaches by which it could determine the taking issue.
It cited the recent United States Supreme Court case of Goldblatt
v. Town of Hempstead,17 in which the challenged ordinance com-
pletely destroyed the value of the appellant's preexisting mining
business. In Goldblatt, the Court stated that an ordinance does not
constitute a taking merely because it "completely prohibits a bene-
ficial use to which the property had previously been put." However,
the Court cites Holmes in Mahon for the proposition that govern-
13. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) ; Jackman v. Rosenbaum
Co., 260 U.S. 22 (1922) ; Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914).
14. Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 Colum. L. Rev.
650 (1958), and Flood Control Via the Police Po'wer, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1098 (1959).
Query if such a dichotomy is helpful in the type of situation presented in Volpe,
where the only economically beneficial use of the land is harmful.
15. Sax, supra note 12.
16. Although the author of this approach feels that a case like Morris County
Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d
232 (1963), presents no challenge to the utility of his proposal, Sax, supra note 12,
at 72, it is certainly arguable in a case like Volpe that regulation "arbitrates" between
the interests of the developer and the fishing industry.
17. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
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ment action in the form of a regulation may under certain circum-
stances "be so onerous as to constitute a taking." Although the
Court in Goldblatt found the record inadequate to allow it to decide
the taking issue, it did observe that "although a comparison of
values before and after is relevant . . . [citing Mahon] it is by
no means conclusive."' 8
As was the case in Goldblatt, the Massachusetts court in Volpe
found the record insufficient for it to determine the taking issue.
It therefore remanded for further findings with respect to the
following matters:
* * *
2. The uses which can be made of the locus in its natural state (a)
independently of other land of the owner in the area; (b) in
conjunction with other land of the owner.
3. The assessed value of the locus for each of the five years, 1960
to 1964, inclusive.
4. The cost of the locus to the defendant.
5. The present fair market value of the locus (a) subject to the
limitations imposed by the Commissioner; (b) free of such
limitations.
6. The estimated cost of the improvements proposed by the de-
fendant.19
Furthermore, the court in Volpe indicated its desire that briefs
and oral arguments be directed to certain related issues, as follows:
A. Would the Commonwealth, by the imposition of the proposed
restriction, take property without just compensation, if there is no
substantial possible use of the locus while subject to the proposed
restriction which will yield to the owner of the locus a fair return
(1) upon the amount of his investment in the locus, or (2) upon
what would be the fair market value of the locus free of the re-
striction ?
B. If it is contended that the land, if subject to the proposed
restriction, may be profitably used in connection with other land,
is this relevant, and, if so, to what extent?
C. Is it relevant to questions A or B that the locus is not suitable
in its present state for residential or commercial use ?20
18. 369 U.S. at 594.
19. 206 N.E.2d at 671-72.
20. Id. at 672.
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Although from its reliance on Morris County Land Improve-
ment Company and Dooley the court in Volpe appears inclined to-
wards a "confiscation" version of the taking test, it also apparently
appreciates that it makes a great deal of difference how one deter-
mines the base upon which "reasonable return" is calculated."
Whether or not one agrees with the particular version of the taking
test that the Massachusetts court may finally adopt, it is enlighten-
ing to see a court in a concrete situation grapple with the problem
of articulating a formula by which the theoretical standard can be
applied. If, for example, the court uses as a base the fair market
value of the locus free of the restriction, it is clear that it is much
easier to make out a case of "confiscation" than it is where "amount
of . . . investment" is used as the basis of comparison. The other
questions asked by the court raise similar problems, all of which
should be pondered by other courts about to undertake the perilous
task of formulating a constitutional standard for use in situations
similar to that presented in Volpe.
WILLIAM E. RYCKMAN, JR. t
21. The court also raises a question regarding the effect and relevance of a
colonial ordinance which altered the common-law rule that the right of riparian
owners, bounded upon tide waters, extended only to the high water mark. Under
the colony ordinance of 1647, commonly known as the Ordinance of 1641, such riparian
owners were declared to "have property to the low water mark, where the sea doth
not ebb above a hundred rods." See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53
(1851). In Alger, the court held that because the common law had regarded the sea-
shores as publici juris, to be held and regulated for the common good, it is well under-
stood that all grants of the jus privatum in the seashore are subject to the right of the
legislature "by a general law affecting all riparian proprietors on the same line of
shore equally and alike, to make reasonable regulations, declaring the public right,
and providing for its preservation by reasonable restraints." Id. at 95. By virtue
of this history it is perhaps possible to argue that a statute regulating tidelands for
the public good may constitutionally impose more severe restrictions than would be
possible with respect to private land above the high water mark.
t Associate Professor of Law, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts.
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